A KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL USING CONJUGACY PROBLEM IN THE DIVISION SEMIRINGS by R, Vijayaragavan
Vol 6, Issue 1, 2018 ISSN -  2347-1573 
A KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL USING CONJUGACY PROBLEM IN THE DIVISION SEMIRINGS
VIJAYARAGAVAN R*
ABSTRACT
In this article, we present a new key exchange protocol which works in the division semiring. We prove that the protocol meets the security of key 
establishment based on the conjugacy search problem and security attribute also discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
A protocol which allows for a key exchange between two parties using 
a secret key to use in their succeeding private communication is known 
to be a key exchange protocol. Diffie and Hellman introduced the first 
key exchange protocol in 1976 [3]. Many key exchange protocols were 
developed using discrete logarithm problem. The development in 
quantum computing made easy to solve the discrete logarithm problem. 
Hence, the mathematicians search for new key exchange relying on hard 
problem. The new key exchange protocols work over non-commutative 
cryptography. A public-key cryptosystem was built using finite non-
abelian groups. The system works under the conjugate action defined 
on the discrete logarithm problem in the inner automorphism groups. 
This public key cryptosystem was proposed [12]. Diffie and Hellman 
key agreement using Braid group was proposed by Koetal, in 2001 [8]. 
Cryptography based on braid group uses conjugacy search problem 
(CSP). Anshel et al.’s key exchange also uses CSP for the secured 
protocol. Grigoriev and Shpilrain proposed on authentication scheme 
using CSP in non-commutative semigroup in 2010 [6].
In this paper, we introduce a key exchange scheme over non-
commutative division semirings. The base for our construction is 
CSP in non-commutative division semirings. Conjugacy decision 
problem (CDP) is easy to compute and CSP is computationally hard. 
In this article, we propose a first key exchange scheme over non-
commutative division semirings. This demonstrates the usefulness 




A semiring R is a non-empty set, on which operations of addition and 
multiplication have been defined as follows:
i. (R,+) is a commutative monoid with identity element 
ii. (R,+•) is a monoid with identity element 
iii. Multiplication distributes over addition from either side
iv. 0•r=r•0 for all in R.
Definition 2
An element r of a semiring R is a “unit” if and only if there exists an 
element r1 of R satisfying r•r1=r1•r=1. The element r1 is called the inverse 
of r in R. If such an inverse r1 exists for a unit r, it must be unique. We 
will normally denote the inverse of r by r−1. It is straightforward to see 
that, if r and r1 units of R, then r•r−1=r−1•r and in particular (r−1)−1=r. We 
will denote the set of all units of R, by U(R). This set is non-empty, since 
it contains “1,” and is not all of R, since it does not contain “0”. We have 
just noted that U(R) is a submonoid of (R,•), which is in fact a group. If 
U(R)=R/{0}, then R is a division semiring.
Further cryptographic assumptions on non-commutative division 
semirings
We consider some mathematically hard problem in division semirings. 




(x,y)∈S×S such that y=axa−1 for some α∈s.
Objective
The objective is to determine whether x and y are conjugate or not.
Review Article
Since  Diffie  and  Hellman  first  presented  a  public-key 
cryptosystem (PKC) in using a trapdoor one-way function, and 
many PKCs have been proposed and broken. Most of successful
 PKCs require large prime numbers. The difficulty of factorization
 of integers with large prime factors forms the ground of RSA and its 
variants  such  as  Rabin- Williams,  LUC’s  scheme,  or  elliptic  curve 
versions  of  RSA like  KMOV. Furthermore,  the  difficulty  of  the  discrete 
logarithm  problem  forms  the  ground  of  Diffie–Hellman  type  schemes 
such  as  ElGamal,  elliptic  curve  cryptosystem,  DSS,  and  McCurley. 
There  have  been  several  efforts  to  develop  alternative  PKCs 
that are not based on number theory. The first attempt was 
to  use  NP-hard  problems  in  combinatorics  like 
Merkle–Hellman Knapsack and its  modifications .  Though 
many  cryptographers  have  been  pessimistic  about 
combinatorial  cryptography  after  the  breakdown  of  the 
Knapsack-type PKCs by Shamir et al., and after the appearance 
of  Brassard  theorem,  there  may  still  be  some  hopes  as  Koblitz 
has  noted  in.  The  other  systems  that  are  worth  to  mention  are 
the quantum cryptography proposed by Bennet and Brassard, and
 the  lattice  cryptography  proposed  by  Goldreich  and  Halevi. 
Another approach is to use hard problems in combinatorial group
 theory such as the word problem or using the Lyndon words. 
Recently,  Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld  proposed  a  key  agreement 
system and a PKC using groups where the word problem is easy but
 the  conjugacy  problem  is  intractable.  Moreover,  they  noted  that  the 
usage of braid groups is particularly promising. Our proposed systems 
are based on the braid groups but are independent from their 
algebraic  key establishment  protocol  on monoids  in.  Most  of 
cryptosystems  derived  from  combinatorial  group  theory  are 
mainly theoretical or have certain limitations in wide and general 
practice.  This  is  perhaps  due  to  the  lack  of  efficient 
description of group elements and operations or due to the 
difficulty of implementing cryptosystems themselves.
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CSP
Instance
(x,y)∈S×S such that y=axa−1 for some α∈s. 
Objective
The objective is to find b∈S such that y=bxb−1.
KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL BASED ON CSP
The CSP
The CSP is to find X∈T satisfying ϕ→XϕX−1 for some X∈T CSP asks to 
locate at least one exacting element X∈T It is measured infeasible to 
solve CSP and is to be hard. The random conjugate of ϕ fto be equal to X 
is insignificant. Hence, the probability is negligible.
Let T be the division semiring of inner automorphism.
Let X∈T;
ϕ∈ T be A’s long-term private key.
XA = ϕxϕ−1 is A’s long-term public key.
X∈T be B’s long-term private key.
XB = XxX−1 B’s long- term public key.
Key exchange
S1. A chooses τ∈T and computes
 YA = τxτ−1.
 If YA = I (identity), the protocol terminates, otherwise A sends YA to B.
S2. After receiving YA, B chooses ∈T and computes KB = χ  XA
−χ 1
and YB = KBω YAω−1 KB−1
S3. If YB or KB = I, then the protocol terminates, else B sends YB to A.
S4. After receiving YB, A computes.
 KA = ϕXBϕ−1.
The shared key for A is KEYA = τKA−1YAKAτ−1.
S5. B computes the shared key KEYB = ωYAω−1.
S6. If KEYA or KEYB is I, then termination of protocol run occurs.
S7. A and B share the secret key after a regular protocol running.
 K = KEYA = KEYB.
SECURITY CONSIDERATION
As by our assumption that the CSP is hard, our protocol meets the 
following desirable attributes.
Security of known-key
It is clearly known that A and B share their unique session key K if they 
follow the Key exchange protocol as proposed above.
the previous or next session keys. He has to compute XXAX−1 which is 
impossible as the CSP is well secured, and hence, our key exchange 
protocol has the forward secrecy.
Key-compromise impersonation
If an adversary E wants to impersonate A by knowing A’s long-term 
private key ϕ, it is not possible for him to impersonate B to A without 
knowing B’s long-term private key X. To impersonate successfully, E 
should know the ephemeral key τ of A for this he should extract τ from 
A’s ephemeral public value YA=τxτ−1 which is not possible as the CSP is 
hard.
Unknown key-share
An adversary E should try to make A believing that the session key is 
shared with B, where B believes that the session key shared with E. For 
this, he sets his public key to be certified using the public keys of A and 
B, i.e., XA, XB, and x. However, after simple calculation, we come to know 
that the unknown key-share attack fails.
Key control
The key control can be possible only by the key agreeing parties and no 
third party can have a key control. Hence, the key control attack may 
happen only by the key exchanging party of the protocol B. For this, B 
should solve the following K = ωYAω−1. Again, it is impossible because of 
the hardness of CSP.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we proposed a new key exchange protocol using 
division semiring generated by inner automorphism. For the security 
consideration of the protocol, we rely on the CSP in a division semiring 
generated by inner automorphism. Our protocol makes use of the fact 
that the CSP is hard in the described structure. We prove that our key 
exchange protocol is secure against many well-known attacks.
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o know 
Forward secrecy
For each entity, the random elements τ and ω act on the session key 
K during the computation. For an intruder who knows the 
private keys of A or B, i.e., ϕ or X could extract KA or KB from YA and YB 
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